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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION
AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME.
In the discussion of thf.,question it will first be
necessary to consider the elements which must be proved
in order that criminal liability may be fixed on any
person. To constitute a crime, there must be (1) an act,
and (2) a criminal intent, or (3) criminal negligence,
(4) which must concur in point of time.
A criminal intention is the state of mind of a per-
son when he consciously violates the law, without legal
justification or excuse. The aim of the law in all
criminal cases, is, not the redress of a private wrong,
but the punishment of the individual committing the
crime. This being the case it would be a great injus-
tice to punish a person for a wrongful act unless he
intended evil or was careless in what he did. This
doctrine has been laid down in many adjudicated cases as
well as in the old maxims of the common law.
The only exceptions to this general statement are to
be found in acts made criminal by statute, and in such
cases no proof of intention need be offered. Illustra-
2tions of such laws are found in the statutes prohibiting
the sale of intoxicating liquors to minors and also in
the sales of adulterated food. In such cases a viola-
tion of the statute may render a person criminally liable
even though he be wholly free from moral blame. It is
suggested however, that in each of these cases there is
ordinarily negligence, or an intention to infringe on
another's civil rights, or to do some moral wrong, any of
which might supply a criminal intent.
Criminal intent is divided into General and Specific
intent. The general intent is the intent to do the act
done. When one does an unlawful act, he is by law
presumed to have intended to do it, and to have intended
its natural and ordinary consequences. This is so
because he must have foreseen the consequences which
would result from the commission of the unlawful act.
When, however, the act is not criminal in itself but
becomes so only if done with a particular intent, then
this intent must be proved. This is called the Specific
intent. For example, where the crime charged is assault
with intent to kill, or assault with intent to commit
rape, the crime is not committed unless the specific
intent charged is proved. In these cases the gist of
3the crime is the intent itself : but so long as the crime
remains a mere intention, it is not punishable ; an at-
tempt to carry out the intention, which falls short of
its consummation, is necessary. From this brief dis-
cussion it is at once apparent that evidence of intoxica-
tion can never be admitted to disprove the general
criminal intent. However, if a specific intent be a
necessary element in a particular crime, evidence of in-
toxication is admissible, to show that such an intent
could not have been entertained, and thus to change the
nature or grade of the offence for which the prisoner
may be commited. This is a statement of the law as it
stands at the present time in a majority of the states.
The Roman law made great allowances for this vice
and admitted evidence of it as defence in a criminal ac-
tion. In Greece, by a law of Pittacus, it was enacted
"that he who committed a crime when drunk, should re-
ceive a double punishment," one for the crime itself,
and the other for the drunkenness which caused him to
commit it.
According to Blackstone, the English law looked
upon intoxication as an aggravation of the offense,
rather than any excuse. Lord Coke says,--"He who be-
4comes voluntarily intoxicated, hath no privilege there-
by ; but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness
doth aggravate it." The case of Renigre vs. Zogossa,
(Plowd.19) declares "that if a person that is drunk kills
another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for
it ; and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he
was drunk he had no understanding or memory ; but inas-
much as that ignorance was occasioned by his own act
and folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be
privileged thereby."
While this was the rule of the English law, the
courts established this exception. If a man became in-
voluntarily reduced to madness by intoxication, then he
had the same defence as in any other case of insanity.
It was also held that evidence of intoxication was ad-
missible where it was material to inquire whether the
crime was done after deliberation or in hot blood.
The cases of Joseph Hume, decided in 1732 and Patrick
Kinninmountdecided in 1697 are among the oldest and
fully substantiate the above propositions. Having thus
briefly passed over the introductory part of our sub-
ject, it will be admissible to investigate the law as
found in New York Statethis being the generally adopted
rule of this country. Afterwards it will be interesting
to note any variance found in any of the other States
of the Union.
New York.
The law in New York State, as regards the admissi-
bility of evidence of intoxication in criminal cases, is
practically the law of a majority of the states of the
Union.
One of the first cases to be found in New York is
that of People vs. Robinson, 1 Parker's Criminal Reports,
649. The defendant was on trial for the murder of one
Lanagan by poison. It was proved that she administered
the poison while she was in a state of intoxication.
In the charge to the jury the judge said,--"If the ac-
cused mingled poison in the beer that was drank by
Lanagan, the law charges her with a design to kill him
and although she may have been excited by drink at the
time, even to such an extent as not to know what she was
doing, she must answer for the consequences. Her self-
inflicted insanity must not be allowed to avail her for
defence. The law imputes to her still a murderous in-
tent. A man may reasonably be presumed to intend to
do what he in fact does. If it appears that the
faculties of his mind had become so disordered that he
was no longer capable of discriminating between right
and wrong in respect to the act he has committed, then
the law, in its justice, pronounces him innocent of the
crime. But, if his derangement is voluntary ; if his
madness be self-invited ; the law will not hear him
when he makes his intoxication his plea to excuse him
from punishment." The court farther appears to suggest
that if the defendant in this case, instead of drinking
enough to render her merely unconscious of what she was
doing had continued drinking and thereby brought on
delirium tremens or insanity, that then she would not be
accountable for her crime. The court considers the
first condition a voluntary one and the second brought
about by the visitation Qf God. At the time of this
case there was but one degree of murder in New York
State. The prisoner was found guilty but it is certain
that a verdict of murder in the first degree could not be
rendered under a similar state of facts at the present
time.
The case of People vs. Fuller, decided in 1823, is
an extreme one. The court in this case holds that in-
toxication is a voluntary deprivation of reason, and
that if a person under the influence of liquor does an
act which would be a crime if he were sober, the intoxi-
cation is an aggravation of the offense, and cannot be
given in evidence in mitigation of the guilt of the
prisoner.
Outside of a very few exceptional cases of this
class, the law in New York had always been quite settled.
It is provided by Section 22 of the Penal Code that:
"No act conmitted by a person while in a state of intoxi-
cation shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his
having been in such condition. But whenever the actual
existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent,
is a necessary element to constitute a particular species
or degree of crime, the jury may take into the consider-
ation the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the
time,in determining the purpose, motive or intent, with
which he committed the act."
It is held in the case of People vs. Batting, (49
Howard Pr. Rep. 392), that proof of voluntary intoxica-
tion may reduce the crime of murder to the second degree.
A deliberate intention to kill is the essential feat-
ure of murder in the first degree. When the mind, from
intoxication is deprived of its power to form a design
with deliberation, then the offense is lowered to the
second degree. But intoxication cannot be introduced
to excuse the crime or make it less than murder in the
second degree.
In a similar manner, evidence of intoxication, may
reduce a charge of assault with intent to kill to simple
assault.
DEGREE OF INTOXICATION NECESSARY
TO SHOW ABSENCE OF PREMEDITATION.
It is stated in section 22, Code Criminal Procedure
that the jury may take into consideration the fact that
the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining
the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed
the act. The question which arises is, does intoxica-
tion always tend to show an absence of deliberation or
premeditation. Upon consideration it is apparent that
in some instances it might prevent a person from forming
an intent or motive, while in other cases it would not.
The degree of intoxication, the condition of the mind of
9the person intoxicated, and other circtunstances must be
considered. A man may be intoxicated and yet be able
to form a deliberate intent.
In the case of People vs. Fish, (125 N. Y. 136) the
rule is laid down that if the accused person be sober
enough to form an intent and so deliberate upon and
premediate the crime, then he is responsible the same as
if he had been perfectly sober, and that he is guilty
even though intoxicated.
Perhaps the best statement of the rule as it now
stands is found in the case of People vs. Leonardi,
(143 N. Y. 360) and I may be pardoned from quoting from
the opinion rendered by Judge Peckham. He says,-- "We
do not think that under this statute the intoxication
need be to such an extent as to necessarily and actually
preclude the defendant from forming an intent or from
being actuated by a motive before the jury would have the
right to regard it as having any legal effect upon the
character of defendant's act. Any intoxication, the
statute says, may be considered by the jury and the
decision as to its effect rests with them. That a man
may be even grossly intoxicated and yet be capable of
forming an intent to kill or do some other criminal act
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is indisputable, and if, while intoxicated, he forms an
intent to kill and carries it out with premeditation, and
deliberation, he is without doubt guilty of murder in the
first degree. If his intoxication made him more excit-
able and led him the more readily and easily to commit
the crime, to form the intent and to reach a conclusion,
as the result of deliberation upon it, then his intoxi-
cation would not help him. He must be so completely
intoxicated in order to be excused as to be destitute
of the capacity to realize the wrongful nature of his
act ; that his acts are wholly aimless and without
purpose.
The jury should not allow intoxication to alter the
character or grade of the criminal act unless they have
a fair and reasonable doubt of the existence of the
necessary criminal purpose or intent after a considera-
tion of such evidence of intoxication.
THE CHANGE EFFECTED BY THE PASSAGE
OF SECTION 22, PENAL CODE.
The passage of section twenty-two of the Penal Code
completely changed the rule which had been laid down in
New York and followed up to 1881. This fact must be
borne in mind in the study of cases which arose prior to
the passage of this law.
In the case of People vs. Batting, which arose in
1874, it was held that no degree of intoxication will be
a defense to murder. It was said that the law in such
cases does not seek to ascertain the actual state of the
perpetrator's mind. The fact from which this state is
implied having been proved, the law presumes the exist-
ence of malice and intent. Proof in opposition to this
presumption was considered inadmissible. Therefore a
party could not show that he was so drunk as not to be
capable of entertaining a malicious feeling or intent.
The court in the case of Flannigan vs. People,
(86 N. Y., 554) says, "The rule is well settled that
voluntary intoxication of one who, without provocation,
commits a homicide, although amounting to frenzy, does
not exempt him from the same legal influences upon the
question of intent, as affecting the grade of his crime,
which are applicable to a person entirely sober."
This ruling was universally sustained prior to the
year 1881 but of course would not be followed now. It
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is merely a matter of historic interest. A great
majority of the states have adopted the same general
rule as that which is found in New York at the present
time.
The laws of a number of states which differ from the
general rule will be noted below.
A L A B A M A.
A most exceptional case is found in this State in the
case of State v. Bullock, (13 Ala.413). The defendant was
on trial for assault with intent to kill. The Court held
that although drunkenness reduces a man to a state of tempor-
ary insanity it does not excuse his offense committed in a
fit of intoxication, and that malice was inferred from the
character of the weapon used, which legal presumption could
not be rebutted by evidence of intoxication. The Court
charged the jury that the drunkenness of the prisoner should
have no effect upon their consideration. This case was cited
with approval in the case of Beasley v.State,(50 Ala.149).
However, in the case of Ford v. State in 71 Ala. 385, it was
held that voluntary intoxication may sometimes operate to re-
but the existence of malice so as to reduce the grade of
homicide, or other crime of which malice is a necessary in-
gredient.
The court in this case, apparently disregarding the case
in 13 Ala. 413 cited above, lays down the same general rule
as is found in a majority of the states.
G E 0 R G I A.
The rule laid down in Georgia is that if a man, when
unexcited by liquor is capable of distinguishing between
right and wrong, and he voluntarily deprives himself of
reason by intoxication, then he is responsible for his acts
while in that condition.
A statute in this state provides that voluntary drunken-
ness is no excuse to crime, and a late case in the applica-
tion of this statute holds that if evidence of intoxication
be allowed to lower the grade of the crime, or to lessen it in
any case whatever, it is thereby made some excuse, and con-
sequently contrary to the spirit of the statute.
M I S S 0 U R I.
It has been held in the State of Missouri in the case of
State v. Sneed (88 Mo. 138), that evidence of intoxication is
inadmissible, either to show that no crime was committed or
to reduce its grade from murder in the first degree to murder
in the second. The Court says, "However differently the
question may have been decided elsewhere, we are not disposed
to overthrow the rule thus established in this State, be-
lieving it to rest upon reason and authority, and that any
departure from it would neither be in the interest of a high-
er civilization, nor promotive of the best interests of soci-
ety, nor conducive to the ends of Justice."
PENNSYLVANIA.
It has been held in one of the earlier cases in Pennsyl-
vania that intoxication is rather an aggravation than a de-
fense of crime. One of the later cases holds that when a
man has not the power to distinguish between right and wrong,
he is not accountable for his crimes and accordingly when in-
toxication is so great as to render it impossible for a man
to form any complete intention, that the lav: allows it to
reduce the grade of homicide from murder in the first to
murder in the second degree.
TENNE S SEE.
In this state it was held in 1827 that if the person ac-
cused of murder was insane, then this would be a defense
to the crime. But it was held that if this insanity arose
from drunkenness, then it would be no defense to the crime.
"Insanity which is the immediate effect of intoxication is
no excuse ; he is equally responsible for all his acts."
In 1829, a statute was passed by which murder was divided
into the first and second degrees. Deliberation and premedita
tion was necessary to convict of murder in the first degree.
The passage of this act seems to have changed the law in
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Tennessee completely for some years later it was held that
upon a trial for murder in the first degree, drunkenness to
any extent was relevant, although the drunkenness was not so
excessive as to render the accused incapable of deliberating.
Yet if it might have excited him and produced a state of
mind unfavorable to premeditation and deliberation it was ad-
missible. This remains the law at the present time in that
state.
INSANITY PRODUCED BY TIM U.Mi± .
It is laid down in the case of Nevada v.Thompson (12 Nev.
140) that temporary insanity, produced immediately by intoxi-
cation, does not destroy responsibility when the patient,
when sane and responsible, made himself voluntarily intoxi-
cated.
This proposition seems to be a settled rule of law.
On the other hand, if the habit of drinking has created a
fixed frenzy or insanity, as delirum tremens, it is the same
as if produced by any other cause, it excuses the act which
otherwise w-uld be criminal.
Supported by Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266; W.Va. v.
Robinson, 20 Vr.Va. 713.
LARCENY.
While the rule as to the admission of evidence of in-
toxication as a defense to the crime of larceny, cannot be re-
garded as an entirely settled one, still the great majority
of the courts have followed the rule which is herein stated.
To prove the crime of larceny it is necessary to prove a spe-
cific intent to commit the act charged. If a man becomes so
drunk that he is incapable of entertaining this intent, and
in this condition, he takes another persons property, and re-
linquishes them before the intent could come upon him or re-
turns them when he regains his right mind, then there is no
larceny. From the very nature of the ofience, there must
be the criminal intent, and this cannot exist in the mind of
one who is too drunk to entertain a specific intent of any
kind.
This proposition is supported by the following authori-
ties :
Woods v. State, 34 Ark. 341.
Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647.
People v. Walker, 38 M'ich. 156.
Bishop on Crim. Law, Vol. I, Sec. 412.
In the case of Chatham v. State (92 Ala.47) decided in
1890, defendant was prosecuted for larceny. There being some
evidence that he was drunk when he committed the alleged
crime. The court held that he had a right to have the jury
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pass on the evidence showing the extent and degree of his
intoxication, as affecting his mental capacity to form
the specific intent which is of the essence of the of-
fence ; but the jury should be instructed that his in-
toxication is no excuse, unless os excessive as to ren-
der him incapable of consciousness that he is conmmitting
the crime-- incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong ; stupefaction of the reasoning faculty."
The latest case to be found in New York is that of
People v. Burns (33 Hun. 296). The defendant was on
trial for larceny and the judge charged the jury that
they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant intended to commit a crime, and that the
jury must take into consideration the intoxication of
the defendant in determining the intent with which the
defendant entered the building in question. This de-
cision was sustained in the upper court in New York and
is according to the gener l rule as laid down in a ma-
jority of the States.
, PERJURY.
The law as to the admissibility of evidence of in-
toxication as a defense to the crime of perjury is
settled in New York by the case of People v. Willey,
(Park. Crim. Rep. 19.) In this case it was held that
intoxcation could not be offered in defense to an in-
dictment for perjury. In this case the accused was in-
toxicated when he came before the magistrate, and obtain-
ed the warrant, at which time he made the false state-
ments.
In the case of Lytle v. State, (31 Ohio St. Rep. 196)
perjury was charged upon the testimony given in reference
to a past transaction at the time of which the accused
was intoxicated. It was held that the question as to
whether the accused was too drunk to form an intent to
commit the crime of perjury should have been left to
the jury. If he was too drunk to know what he was say-
ing, or to form an intent, he could not be guilty of
violating his oath.
PASSING COUNTERFEIT MONEY.
The crime of passing counterfeit money consists of
knowingly passing it and it often requires much skill
to detect a counterfeit. To rebut the presumption of
knowledge it is competent for the accused to show that
he was too drunk at the time he passed the money in
question to be able to know that it was counterfeit.
However if the prosecution shows that the accused pro-
cured the money for the purpose of passing it, the evi-
dence of intoxication will not be allowed weight. In
the case of U. S. v. Rowdenburse, (1 Bald. 514) the
court charged that if the accused was in such a state of
intoxication when he received the counterfeit bills as
not to know what he was receiving, then you may say that
he did not receive them as known counterfeits ; and be-
fore you can find him guilty you will require, besides
proof of his passing them as true, proof that he knew
they were false.
F 0 R G E R Y.
Intent is a necessary element in the crime of for-
gery, an intent to defraud is made an element by statute
in a majority of the states. If, through intoxication,
the person accused was unable or incapable of forming
such intent, he cannot be held guilty.
See-- People v. Blake, 5 Crim. Law Mag. 722.
B I B L I 0 G R A P H Y.
----------0 ----
Bishop, on Criminal Law : Vol.I. p. 399.
Lawson's Criminal Defenses : Vol.11. pp. 533-768.
American and English Encyclopaedia of Law : Vol.IV.
pp.208-715 ; pp.802-809.
Cook's Penal Code : Sec.22 and note.
May's Criminal Law : pp.5-9
May's Criminal Law : pp. 21-22.
Blackstone's Comnentaries : Vol.IV. p.26
Clark's Criminal Law : pp. 60-65.
People vs. Leonardi : 143 N. Y. 360.
Reniger vs. Zogossa : Plowd. 19.
People vs. Robinson : 1 Park. Or. Rep. 649.
People vs. Batting : 49 Howard Pr. Rep. 392.
People vs. Fish : 125 N. Y. 136.
Flannigan vs. People : 86 N. Y. 554.
State vs. Bullock : 13 Ala. 413.
Beasley vs. State : 50 Ala. 149.
Ford vs. State : 71 Ala. 385.
State vs. Sneed : 88 Mo. 138.
Nevada vs. Thompson : 12 Nev. 140.
Lanegan vs. People : 50 Barb. 266.
W. Va. vs. Robinson : 20 W. Va. 713.
Woods vs. State : 34 Ark. 341.
Ingalls vs. State : 48 Wis. 647.
People vs. Walker : 38 Mich. 156.
Chatham vs. State : 92 Ala. 47.
People vs. Burns : 33 Hun. 296.
People vs. Willey : 2 Park. Cr. Rep. 19.
Lytle vs. State : 31 Ohio St. Rep. 196.
U. S. vs. Rowdenburse : 1 Bald. 514.
People vs. Blake : 5 Cr. Law Rep. 722.

